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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 18083

vs.
ZOLLA HALES,
Defendant and
Appellant.

---0000000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
---0000000---

STATE:MENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from a conviction of a violation of
§

76-8-412 U.C.A. (1953 as amended).

Appellant claims this

statute is improperly applied since the same conduct is proscribed by

§

76-6-504, a Class B misdemeanor.

Appellant

also claims that reversible error was committed at trial by
the state prosecutor.

This Third Degree felony was first

prosecuted in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County and was tried before a jury on August 19th and 20th,
1981.

The trial resulted in a conviction and a judgment by

Judge J. Robert Bullock after referral of the Defendant to
the adult probation and parole board.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and conviction and a re-trial under the correct section of the Utah
Code.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, Zolla Hales, was employed by the Town of
Oak Ridge, formerly Salem Hills, as Town Recorder from
December 1976 until January 1980, at which time she was to
turn the office over to a newly appointed Recorder.

On

February 11, 1980, while the books were being prepared for
an audit prior to their transfer to the new Recorder, some
of the books and records were destroyed by fire at Mrs.
Hales' residence.

After contacting her husband, Mrs. Hales

waited a short while until he arrived home and attempted to
contact other members of the Town Council, but was unsuccessful.

She then contacted the new Recorder who also came to

the Hales' residence.

..After her arrival, Mr. Hales contacted

the Mayor who in turn called the Sheriff's Office and the
County Fire Marshall.

Subsequently, the damage was inspected

by the Mayor, a Deputy Sheriff, the town volunteer fire chief,
and the State Fire Marshall, and the charges were then raised
against Mrs. Hales under.§ 76-8-412 Utah Code Annotated.
Defendant submitted a motion to dismiss the information based
on the fact that the overlapping statutes § 76-6-504 and
§ 76-8-412 U.C.A.

imposed different penalties for the same
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-3conduct and Defendant was charged under the statute
imposing the greater penalty.

The motion was denied.

Defendant also submitted jury instructions to the effect
that the correct choice of laws was a jury question.
However, those instructions were not given, and trial
proceeded exclusively under.§ 76-8-412 U.C .A.

Although

Defendant maintained that the fire was accidental, the
trial resulted in a conviction under the specified code
section.

Ttis is an appeal of that conviction.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR ABOUT THE DEFENDAi\JT' S
CHOICE NOT TO TESTIFY VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In a 1965 landmark decision in Griffin v California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
comments by the prosecutor about the failure of a Defendant to testify can effectively abridge the Defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights to refuse to testify and therefore
can constitute reversible error.

At the same time the

Supreme Court decided that this principle applied to
state criminal trials by the Fourteenth Amendment:
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-4We said in Malloy v Hogan, supra, p. 11,
that "the same standards must determine
whether an accused's silence in either a
fedei-:-al or state proceeding is justified. "
We take that in its literal sense and hold
that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct
application to the Federal Government, and
in its bearing on the States by reason of
the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either
comment by the prosecution on the accused's
silence or instructions by the court that
such silence is evidence of guilt.
380 U.S.
at 615.
The reason the prosecutor cannot properly comment on
the De£endant's failure to testify is clearly stated in
Griffin.

A rule allowing prosecutor comments "[I]s in

substance a rule of evidence that allows the state the
privilege of tendering to the jury for its consideration
the failure of the accused to testify.

Ko formal offer

of proof is made as in other situations, but the prosecution's comments and the Court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance."

380

U.S. at 613.
This is further clarified by the Supreme Court in Wilson
v United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893):
It is not every one who can safely venture on
the witness stand thougt entirely innocent of
the charge against him.
Excessive timidity,
nervousness when facing others and attemptina
to explain transactions of a suspicious char~
acter, and offenses charged against him, will
often confuse and embarrass him to such a
degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him.
It is not every one,
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-5however honest, who would, therefore,
willingly be placed on the witness
stand.
The statute in tenderness to the
weakness of those who from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be a witness,
particularly when they may have been in
some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that the failure
of the defendant in a criminal action to
request to be a witness shall not create
any presumption against him.
149 U.S. at 66.
The Court in Griffin goes on to say, "If the words
'Fifth Amendment' are substituted for

'act' and for

'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause
is reflected;

for cormnent on the refusal to testify is

a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,'
Murphy v Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, which the
Fifth Amendment outlaws.
courts for exercising a

It is a penalty imposed by
constituti~nal

privilege.

It cuts

do"WTI. on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 380
U.S. at 613, 614.
Conrrnents by the prosecutor which violate Zolla Hales'
Fifth Amendment privilege are found in two places in the
transcript of the trial.

First, in commenting on the testi-

many of the Defendant's husband, the prosecutor makes a
clear allusion to the Defendant's failure to testify, and
thereby implies that her purpose was to conceal something.
His statement was as follows,

"Now, with regard to t~r. Hales'

testimony, he has not been accused in this case, he's not on
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-6trial, but he wasn't even a witness to the burning or
to the aftermath of the burning, the immediate aftermath.
But yet he is the one who tells the story."

Transcript

at 128.
Second, the prosecutor made a much more prejudicial
comment when he stated the following:
Now the only testimony, really, if testimony
it is regarding how it occurred, how the
burning occurred, comes from the statement
of the Defendant that you will have as an
exhibi~ She would be the only one to come
in and say how it happened, because apparently her husband was not home at the time,
and yet he's the one who testifies as to
what occurred.
Now it seems to me the refendant' s argument to you is asking you to absolutely disregard your senses with regard to
who has proved what.
I'm surprised he made
no comment on the issue of motive. Ttat's
strange.
Transcript at 142, 143.
These remarks are remarkably similar to some of the comments made by the prosecutor in the Griffin case.

Some

of these comments were as follows:
"The defendant certainly knows whether
Essie Mae had this beat up appearance at
the time he left her apartment and went
down the alley with her ....
"These things he has not seen fit to take
the stand and deny or explain.
'~nd

in the whole world, if anybody would
know, this Defendant would know.
"Essie Hae is dead, she can't tell you her
side of the story. The defendant won't."
380 U.S. at 610, 611.
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-7The U.S. Supreme Court found that such comments were
not permissible and were of a nature to require reversal
of a murder conviction.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v Nomeland, 581 P.2d
1010 (Utah 1978), made clear that it supports the Griffin
case with the following statement:

A number of states have considered the problem, but the thrust of the better-reasoned
cases is set out in State v Jefferson,
wherein it was said:
"In order that there
be a violation of Griffin, it must.appear
that the language used by the prosecutor ...
was manifestly intended or was of such character that a.jury would naturally and necessarily construe to amount to a connnent on
the failure of the accused to te~tify.o .. "
581 P.2d at 1011.
This Court also qualified its support of the Griffin
doctrine by stating in State v Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah

1977):
Accepting the proposition that the remarks
complained of were improper, the question of
more grave concern is whether, in the light
of the total picture as presented in this case,
that impropriety should be regarded as a prejudicial error and justify reversal of the
conviction.
We note our awareness that there
should be no such reversal merely to criticize
a prosecutor who, perhaps in the ardor of
advocacy in the trial, oversteps the bounds of
propriety, nor merely because error has been
committed.
Id., at 1116.
The Ccurt further stated:
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-8[W]e believe that, on appeal, when there is
a reasonable doubt as to whether the error
below was prejudicial, that doubt shoul~ b~
resolved in favor of the defendant.
This is
especially true where the error involved is
one which transgresses against the exercise
of a constitutional right.
Consequently, the
rule which we have numerous times stated is
that if the error is such as to justify a
belief that it had a substantial adverse
effect upon the defendant's right to a fair
trial, in that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there may have been
a different result, then the error should not
be regarded as harmless; and conversely, if
the error is such that it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was harmless in that
the result would have been the same, then the
error should not be deemed prejudicial and
warrant granting a new trial.
Id., at 1116.
In light of the evidence offered by the State against
Zolla Hales, the outcome of the trial could well have been
different in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial
comments.

This is especially obvious when the testimony

of the arson investigator is reviewed.

It can be found

from page 75 to page 86 of the trial transcript.
Therefore, the connnents made by the prosecutor were
prejudicial and violated the defendants constitutional
right to remain silent, and are grounds for reversal of
the Defendant's conviction.

POINT II
SECTIONS 76-6-504 U.r..A. AND 76-8-412 U.C.A. ARE
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-9OVERLAPPING STATUTES PROSCRIBING THE SAME CONDUCT AND
THEREFORE ONLY THE STATUTE IMPOSING A LESSER PENALTY CAN
APPLY.
A settled point of law in Utah is that when more than
one statute proscribes the same or similar conduct, only
the statute which carries the lesser sentence may be imposed.

See, State v Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d

146 (1969); State v Loveless, 581 P.2d 585 (Utah 1978).
The Utah Legislature codified this principle in
U.C.A.

§

77-17-1

(as amended 1953) which states as follows:
When it appears the defendant has committed a
public.offense and there is reasonable doubt
as to which of two or more degrees he is
guilty, he shall be convicted only of the lower
degree.

This principle is solidly based on the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

To allow the courts to apply indiscrirnin-

ately or on the whim of the prosecutor either of two overlapping statutes which carry different penalties for the
same offense would be a clear violation of equal protection.

State v Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 345, 453 P.2d

146' 148 (196 9) '
Since Shondell, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied this principle of law.

Examples of this
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-10application are cases such as State v Fair, 23 Utah 2d
34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969), in which this Court imposed the
lesser of two sentences prescribed by two separate but
overlapping statutes.

In other cases such as Ranrrnell v

Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) this Court has refused
to impose the lesser of two penalties prescribed by different statutes but only because the two related statutes
did not deal with the same conduct.
In § 76-6-504 of the Utah Code, it states:
(1) Any person who, having no privilege to
do so, knowingly falsifies, destroys,
removes, or conceals any writings, . . . or
record, public or private, with intent to
deceive or injure any person or to conceal
any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with
records.
(2) Tampering with records is a class B
misdemeanor.

In§ 76-8-412 of the Utah Code, it states:
Every officer having the custody of any
record, map, or book, or of any paper or
proceedings of any court, filed or deposited in any public office, or placed in
his hands for any purpose, who is guilty
of stealing, willfully destroying, mutilating, defacing, altering, falsifying,
removing, or secreting the whole or any
part thereof, or who permits any other
person so to do, is guilty of a felony of
the third degree.
Section 76-8-412 noted above is followed by § 76-8-413,
which simply states that it is a Class A misdemeanor for
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-11someone not in official custody of public records to do
the same acts specified in § 76-8-412 of the Code.

Sec-

tion 76-6-504 and sections 76-8-412 and 413 proscribe
virtually identical conduct - the destruction of public
records.

Section 76-6-504 U.C.A. makes the destruction

of public records a Class B misdemeanor, where § 76-8-412
makes it a Third Degree felony.

Surprisingly, the require-

ments of proof for the misdemeanor are more strict than
those for the felony.

Section 76-6-504 requires proof

that the destruction of the records by any person be with
the intent of concealing some wrongdoing or of deceiving
or injuring any person.

Section 76-8-412 requires simply

that the records be willfully destroyed by someone holding
them in an official capacity.

In the absence of § 76-8-413,

a case could be made for the proposition that the legislature simply meant to punish a custodian more severely.
Reading §§ 412 and 413 together, however, defeats that possibility.

The conduct sought to be prohibited by both

statutory schemes is the destruction of public records.
Both of these overlapping statutes apply equally well to
Zolla Hales if either one in fact applies.

This is sup-

ported by the prosector in his conunents on page 130 of
the tr{al transcript where he says, "It is the state's
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-12contention, it is our contention that the evidence will
show that this fire was deliberately set to cover up
earlier wrong d oings.

Th at ' s t h~e mo t"ive. "

The distinction dravm by the legislature between
these two statutes is insufficient to mandate the application of one of these two statutes in preference to the
other, therefore, the statute with the lesser penalty
must apply.

In the Shondell case, the justification for

applying the lesser penalty was much less clear than in
this case.

The act which imposed a misdemeanor penalty

for its violation,

§ 58-33-4(a),

states clearly in another

section, § 58-33-6(g), that when an offense under that act
was also prohibited under any other statute,

"that offense

shall not be punishable under this act, but under such
other provision of law."

The same activities with which

the Defendant was charged in Shondell were also prohibited
under § 58-13a-2 U.C.A. and a significantly heavier penalty
was provided.

However, this court found it necessary, in

spite of § 58-33-6(g) to choose between the overlapping
statutes and to choose the statute with the lesser penalty.
In the two overlapping statutes,

§§ 76-6-504 and

76-8-412, which prohibit the destruction of public records
but which impose significantly different punishments, there
is no applicable section similar to § 58-33-6(g).

Therefore,
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-13only § 76-6-504 should apply.
As· this Court said in Shondell:
The well-established rule is that a
statute creating a crime should be
sufficiently certain that persons of
ordinary intelligence who desire to
obey the law may know how to conduct
themselves in conformity with it. A
fair and logical concommittant of that
rule is that such a penal statute
should be similarly clear, specific
and understandable as to the penalty
imposed for its violation. 453 P.2d at
148.
That basic rule of law would make it impossible to
sustain either § 76-6-504 or § 76-8-412 in the absence of
§ 77-17-1 U.C.A. which states:

When it appears the defendant has committed
a public offense and there is reasonable
doubt as to which of two or more degrees he
is guilty, he shall b~ convicted only of the
lower degree.
Therefore, if either statute applies in this case, only
the Class B misdemeanor of § 76-6-504 could apply to the
Defendant Zolla Hales.
CONCLUSION
Because of the prejudicial statements made before the
jury by the prosecutor, the court srnuld reverse the conviction of Zolla Hales and order a new trial, and because
of the overlapping statutes applicable to this case, the
court should also order that only§. 76-6-504 U.C.A. should
apply in any further proceedings.
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-14Respectfully submitted this

8:tl day

of February,

1982.

. {2t_;
W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid,
to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
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?U'\

day of February, 1982.
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